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THE ELEMENTS OF CRBE
THE MENTAL ELEMENT
The second element of a crime is the mental element."
In order that one may be held criminally responsible, it is
not sufficient that he has done some act which the law
prohibits. He must have had a certain mental attitude to-
ward his act.
"The full definition of every crime contains expressly
or by implication a proposition as to a state of mind. There-
fore, if the mental element of any conduct alleged to be a
crime is proved to have been absent in any given case, the
crime is not committed. "2
In order to determine whether an actor is criminally
responsible, it is therefore necessary to determine his men-
tal attitude, toward his act; and in order to do this, it is
necessary to determine his mental attitude with reference to
each constituent part of his act.'
'The first element is discussed in 26 Dickinson Law Review 188.
2Reg. v. Tolson, 23 Q. B. D. 185, per Stephen.
3An act is composed of three parts: origin, circumstances, and
consequences. 26 D. L. R. 118.
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FORMS
The mental attitude required by the law may assume
either one of two forms: (1) intention; (2) negligence.
Negligence is, by some authorities, considered as a form of
intention. But the better view is that intention and negli-
gence are two contrasted and mutually inconsistent states
of mind.
REASON
The reason for requiring this second element as a con-
dition of criminal responsibility is that the primary and es-
sential object of the criminal law is to deter, and in order
to deter there must be a state of mind upon which threats
of punishment can exert an influence.
Intention and negligence are such states of mind. A
threat of punishment may furnish a motive for not desiring
to commit a criminal act. or for taking sufficient care to
avoid it. But in no other case can threats of punishment
be effective.
INTENTION
Intention consists of two elements: (1) foreknowledge
of a thing; (2) a desire for it.
"An act is therefore intentional only if, and in so far
as, it exists in idea before it exists in fact, the idea realizing
itself as the fact because of the desire by which it is accom-
panied. 4
INTENTIONAL ACTS
An act is intended only when every constituent part of
it, to wit: (1) its origin; (2) its consequences and (3) its
consequences, are intended. If any constituent part of the
act is not intentional, the act must be classed as an uninten-
tional act.
4Salmond, Jurisprudence. P. 335.
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ORIGIN
In order that an act may be criminal, its origin, i. e.,
the bodily activity or passivity of the actor, must have been
intended. Intention as to this factor of the criminal act is
essential to criminal responsibility.
For the principle that the bodily activity or passivity of
the actor must be intended, two reasons are found in the
books:
(1) That unless the bodily activity or passivity is in-
tended there is no act.
(2) That intention as to the bodily activity or passiv-
ity is a mental element which must accompany the act.
Bodily activity or passivity may be unintentional be-
cause it is compelled by (1) natural forces or (2) human
agencies. 5
CIRCUMSTANCES
The circumstances of an act may be intentional or un-
intentional. Perhaps it cannot be accurately said that that
circumstances are intentional or intended; but an act is in-
tentional with respect to the circumstances when the actor
knows or blieves them to exist.
An act of which one or more material circumstances is
unintentional is an unintentional act. Thus if a woman
marries during the lifetime of her former husband, but be-
lieving him to be dead, she does not intentionally commit
bigamy, for one of the material circumstances of her act,
the fact that her husband is living, is not within her inten-
tion.
There is no general requirement of the law that all of
the material circumstances of an act must be intentional in
order that an act may constitute a crime. Nor is there any
general rule by which to determine which of the material
5The limits of this article do not permit a discussion of the va-
rious forms of compulsion. Forms of natural compulsion are auto-
matism and irresistable impulse.)
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circumstances must be intentional and which need not be.
A separate study of each crime is necessary in order to de-
termine this. An act which is unintentional with respect to
some material circumstance is said to be done by mistake.
CONSEQUENCES
The consequences of an act may be intentional or unin-
tentional. A consequence of an act is intended or intention-
al if it is desired, whether or not it is expected.
An actor may intend a consequence which he does not
expect, as where he fires a rifle at a man who is a long dis-
tance away. The actor may know that the chance of hitting
him is small and may fully expect of miss him. Neverthe-
less the actor intends to hit him if he desires to do so.
An actor may expect a consequence which he does not
intend, as where a surgeon performs an operation. The
surgeon may know that his patient will probably die from
the operation, nevertheless he does not intend the fatal con-
sequence which he expects. He intends a recovery which
he hopes for but does not expect.
A rule of frequent application in determining whether
a consequence is intended is that a man is presumed to in-
tend the probable cdnsequences of his act. This, however,
is merely a presumption of fact, which prevails in absence
of evidence to the contrary, but which may be overcome by
any evidence which raises a reasonable doubt as to the ex-
istence, in the mind of the actor, of the foreknowledge of,
and a desire for these consequences.
It is true that an actor is frequently held criminally re-
sponsible for consequences which he did not forsee and de-
sire, and responsibility in such cases is frequently said to
be due to this presumption. As a matter of fact, liability is
imposed in these cases regardless of intention, and the state-
ment as to the presumption simply means that intention is
not necessary to create responsibility for these consequences.
There is no general rule that all of the material conse-
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quences of an act must be intentional in order that the act
may constitute a crime. Nor is there any general rule by
which to determine which of the material circumstances
must be intentional and which need not. A separate study
of each crime is necessary to determine this. An act of
which one or more material consequences are unintentional
is an unintentional act, and is said to be done accidentally.
NEGLIGENCE
The term negligence is used in two different senses. It
signifies sometimes a state of mind and at other times con-
duct resulting therefrom. In the former or subjective sense
it means the mental attitude of undue indifference.
The intentional wrongdoer is punished because he de-
sired to do the harm. The negligent wrongdoer is punished
because he did not sufficiently desire to avoid it. Just as
the threats of punishment may deter persons from inten-
tionally causing harm, so it may also deter persons from be-
ing indifferent whether the harm ensues or not.
In order that an act may be criminal its origin must be
intentional,6 but its circumstances or consequences need not
be. Some acts are criminal though some of their material
circumstances or consequences are not intentional but neg-
ligent.
Negligence exists with reference to a circumstance of
an act when the actor is ignorant of this circumstance and
his ignorance is due to his failure to exercise due care. Neg-
ligence exists as to a consequence of an act when (1) the
actor fails to forsee it because of his failure to exercise due
care or (2) the actor forsees the consequence and fails to
use due care to avoid it.
An act of which one material circumstance is negligent
and not intentional, is not an intentional act, and if the ac-
tor is to be held criminally responsible, his responsibility
6See Supra.
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must be based upon negligence, or, as we shall see later, be
absolute.
There is no general rule that all of the material circum-
stances or consequences of an act, if not intentional, must be
negligent in order that the act may constitute a crime. Nor
is there any general rule by which to determine which of the
material circumstances or consequences must be negligent.
A separate study of each crime is necessary to determine
this.
Intention either esists or does not exist. There can be
no question as to the degree in which it is present. Negli-
gence may exist in any degree, and it is therefore necessary
to inquire what degree of negligence is required by the crim-
inal law in cases in which criminal responsibility is predi-
cated wholly or partially on negligence.
This inquiry presents two questions:
(1) The standard by which the degree of the actor's
negligence should be measured.
(2) The degree of deviation from this standard which
is required.
There is a conflict of opinion as to whether the stand-
ard should be an external or internal standard, i. e., whether
an actor's negligence should be judged by the standard of
the average reasonable man or by his own 'standard. The
weight of authority and better opinion seems to support the
former view.
There is also a conflict of opinion as to whether the
negligence must be gross or need only be ordinary. The
weight of authority supports the view that the negligence
must be gross.
CLASSES OF CRIMES
It appears from the foregoing that a crime may be
either intentional or negligent. In addition, however, there
is a third class of crimes, which may be designated as crimes
of absolute liability. The three classes of crimes may be
defined as follows:
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(1) Intentional crimes, in which every part of the
criminal act is intentional.
(2) Crimes of negligence, in which one or more of the
material circumstances or consequences of the criminal act
are not intentional but negligent.
(3) Crimes of absolute liability, in which one or more
of the material circumstances or consequences of the crim-
inal act are neither intentional or negligent.
CRIMES OF ABSOLUTE LIABILITY
Crimes of absolute liability are of two classes:
(1) Those in which one of the material circumstances
of the criminal act need be neither intentional or negligent.
In this class the actor is held responsible in spite of inevita-
ble mistake. This class embraces:
(a) Certain statutory crimes.
(b) Certain crimes in which responsibility is based
on constructive intent.
(b) Certain crimes in which responsibility is based on
constructive intent.
(2) Those in which one of the material consequences
need be neither intentional or negligent. In this class the
actor is held responsible in spite of inevitable accident, and
responsibility is based on the doctrine of constructive in-
tent.
CONSTRUCTIVE INTENT
The doctrine of constructive intent is that an actor may
be held criminally responsible for an act of which one of ti,
material circumstances or consequences was neither inten-
tional or negligent because the act which the actor did in-
tend was criminal or wrongful.
The doctrine is applicable where one of the material
circumstances of the criminal act was neither intentional
or negligent. Thus where a statute made it rape to have
carnal knowledge of a girl under sixteen with her consent,
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and X had carnal knowledge with such a girl, reasonably
believing she was over sixteen, although one of the mater-
ial circumstances of the act was neither intentional or neg-
ligent, X was held guilty of rape, because the act which he
did intend, carnal knowledge of a girl over sixteen, was it-
self wrongful.
The doctrine is applicable where one of the material
consequences is neither intentional or negligent. Thus
where A pushed B with intent to distract his intention in
order that he might steal B's watch, and B fell and was kill-
ed by the fall, although this consequence was not forseen
by A and therefore not intended, and could not have been
forseen by A by the exercise of ordinary care and was there-
fore not negligent, A was held responsible for the death,
because the act which he did intend, robbing of B, was crim-
inal.
There is a conflict of opinion as to the character of the
act which must have been intended in order that the doctrine
of constructive intent may be applied. Authority may be
found for each of the following rules:
(1) The act intended must have been malum in se and
criminal.
(2) The act intended must have been criminal, wheth-
er or not it was malum in se.
(3) The act intended must have been malum in se,
whether or not it was criminal.
MOTIVE
Motive is that which stimulates or excites an actor to
commit an act, and must be destinguished from intent. In-
tent is the actor's purpose to commit the act. Motive is his
purpose in committing it. The intent relates to the act it-
self. The motive passes beyond the act and relates to the
object for the sake of which the act is done.
It has been frequently asserted that motive is never an
essential ingredient of crime. Perhaps it is true, as a gener-
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al rule, that no act otherwise lawful becomes criminal be-
cause done with a bad motive, and, conversely, no act other-
wise criminal is justified or excused because of the motive of
the actor, however good. The law ordinarily judges a man
by what he does, not by the reasons for which he does it.
To this rule as to the irrelevance of motive in criminal
cases there are, however, important exceptions. The char-
acter of an act as being criminal or non-criminal, is frequent-
ly determined by the motive with which the act was done.
In many cases the motive is the source, in which or in part,
of the mischievous tendency of the act and has therefore
been made an essential element of the crime.
The question whether a particular motive is an essential
element of a crime is not always easy to determine. The
definitions of the common law crimes usually indicate
whether a motive is essential or not, e. g. forgery, burglary
and larceny, and this is likewise true of statutory crimes.
A particular motive may, however, be an essential ele-
ment of a statutory crime even when the language of the
statute does not require it. In interpreting statutes, courts
have not infrequently concluded, from the evil sought to be
remedied and other considerations, that it was the intention
of the legislature to make the act criminal only if done with
a certain motive, although there were no words in the stat-
ute expressly requiring such motive.
On the other hand courts have by interpretation occa-
sionally eliminated from the definition of a statutory crime
a motive which was expressly required by the language of
the statute.
The motive of an actor may be complex instead of sim-
ple. He may act from two or more concurrent motives in-
stead of from one only. In cases where a particular motive
is an essential element of a crime, the presence of mixed or
concurrent motives raises difficult questions. Must the re-
quired motive be the sole and exclusive motive; or is it suf-
ficent that it is merely one of selveral motives; or must it be
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the chief or dominative motive, any others being subordinate
and incidental; or must it be a determining motive, that is, a
motive in absence of which the act would not have, been
done, the remaining motives being insufficient by themsel-
ves.
STATUTORY CRIMES
It is commonly stated that a mental element is not an
essential element of statutory crimes, and that the legisla-
ture may make a particular physical condition criminal re-
gardless of the existence of any mental condition.
An examination of the authorities cited for this propo-
sition discloses the fact that in none of them did the courts
hold that the legislature had entirely eliminated the mental
element. It was simply held that the legislature had provi-
ded that the mental element need not extend to particular
circumstances or consequences of the act-that an actor
might be held criminally responsible for an act although
some of its circumstances or consequences were neither in-
tentional or negligent.
It has been held that the power of the legislature thus
to eliminate the mental element in defining crime is not
without limitation; and that the legislature could not make
criminal, e. g., an act which the utmost care and circum-
spection would not enable one to avoid, or deprive one ac-
cused of a crime of the right to invoke insanity as a de-
fense.
SUMMARY
It therefore appears that the mental elements of differ-
ent crimes differ greatly, and it is somewhat confusing and
misleading to call so many dissimilar states of mind by the
same name, such as "mens rea or criminal intent," because
it suggests that, apart from all definitions of particular
crimes, an element exists, as mens rea or criminal intent,
which is always expressly or by implication involved in the
definition of every particular crime.
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It is hardly possible to define the mental element of
crime more narrowly than by saying that it is the particular
state of mind, differing in different crimes, which by the
definition of the particular crime must concur with the
criminal act.
But though the mental elements of various crimes dif-
fer greatly, the mental element which is ordinarily indis-
pensable may be summed up as consisting of an intention to
do an act (origin, circumstances, and consequences) which
is criminal, or, perhaps, that is morally wrongful though
legally innocent.
In some crimes a more complex and special mental ele-
ment is required, and knowledge of particular circumstances
or intention of particular consequences or a motive is nec-
essary.
In other crimes a less complex mental element is suf-
ficient, and an actor may be held responsible though his
act was not intentional but negligent as to the circumstances
or consequences which rendered it criminal or wrongful, and
in some cases though his mental attitude toward these con-
sequences or circumstances was neither intention or negli-
gence.
The necessity for a mental element does not require
that the actor should be conscious that his act is wrong
from either a legal or a moral standpoint. It would there-
fore seem that an ability to know the moral or legal nature
of the act is not an essential factor of the mental element
of crime, and that an inability to do so, from whatever
cause arising, should not constitute a defence in criminal
cases. This is the law, except in cases where the inability
arises from mental disease.
W. H. Hitchler.
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MOOT COURT
COLLINS v. CARROLL
Wills--Election by Husband to Take Against Will-Wilful and Ma-
licious Desertion-Witnesses-Party Dead-Husband and Wife-
Act of May 23, 1887, P. L. 158.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
X died, devising a tract of land to Carroll in fee. Collins,
X's husband, she having died without issue, claims one half of this
tract utnder the intestate act and the right to take against the
will. He, however, had for more than a year previous to the death
of his wife, wilfully and maliciously deserted her, it is alleged by
Carroll. Collins offered himself as a witness to refute this charge.
The Court has rejected his testimony.
Harkins, for the plaintiff.
Inghain, for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Bailey, J. A husband ordinarily has the right to take
against the will of his wife, and if he elects to do so, he is entitled
to such interest as if the testatrix had died intestate.
Section 23, Wills Act of 1917, P. L. 403.
But if the husband has wilfully and maliciously deserted his
wife for a period of more than one year previous to the death of his
wife he loses that right to take against the will. Section 5, Inte-
state Act of 1917, P. L. 429
Collins' right in this case then depends on whether or not he
did desert his wife wilfully and maliciously. Sinse he wished to
testify concerning this question, upon the determination of which
his right to take against the will depends, It is important to decide
whether this testimony was properly excluded.
The Act of May 23, 1887, P. L. 158, says that no person shall
Ve incompetent as a witness by reason of his interest in the suit
except in certain cases provided for by the act. This act is an en-
abling act. It makes competency the rule and incompetency the
exception. Pattison v. Cobb, 212 Pa. 572; Allen's Estate, 207 Pa.
325; Hammill v. Supreme Council, 152 Pa. 537; Keating v. Nolan,
51 Pa. Super. 320; Shadle's Estate, 30 Pa. Super. 151.
If Collins is incompetent, It must be under one of the excep-
tions In the act. Section 5, (e) is as follows: "Nor where any party
to a thing or contract in action Is dead, and his right thereto or
therein has passed, either by his own act or by the act of the law,
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to a party on the record, who represents his interests in the subject
in controversy, shall any surviving party to such thing or contract,
or any other person whose interest shall be adverse to said right of
such deceased party, be a competent witness to any matter occurr-
ing before the death of said party, unless the proceeding..........
be any other issue or inquiry respecting the property of a deceased
owner, and the controversy be between parties respectively claim-
ing such property by devolution on the death of such owner, in
which case all persons shall be fully competent witnesses." Is Col-
lins rendered incompetent by this section?
The last clause making parties, respectively claiming by devolli-
tion, competent does not apply to this case. Carroll claimed under
the will, by purchase, and Collins by virtue of the law, by devolu-
tion. It Is well settled in Pennsylvania that, where one party
claims under a will and the other party against the will, both do
not claim by devolution.
Munson v. Crookston, 219 Pa. 419.
Rifne v. Hal, 187 Pa. 264.
King v. Humphreys, 138 Pa. 310.
Crothers v. Crothers, 149 Pa. 201.
Baldwin v. Stier, 191 Pa. 432.
Myers v. Litts, 195 Pa. 595.
Shroyer v. Smith, 204 Pa. 310.
Cooke v. Doron, 215 Pa. 393.
Sturgeon v. Stevens, 186 Pa. 350.
Eliminating this last clause we will consider whether Collins is
incompetent within the meaning of the exception. In Pattison v.
Cobb, 212 Pa. 572, and in Shadle's Estate, 30 Pa. Super. 151, it is
held that the act is uniformly construed, "in the light of the literal
meaning of its wordis." So we will first analize the act and then
discuss the interpretation given to it by the courts.
To render a person incompetent under section 5 (e) there must
be (1) a thing or contract in action; (2) the decedent must be a par-
ty to it; (3) the thing or contract must now be in action; (4) the
right of the dead party (therein or thereto) must have passed, (a) by
his or her own act or Nb) by the act of the law, to a party on the
record who represents his or her interest therein ("the subject in
controversy") (5) the interest of the witness must be adverse to the
said right of the deceased.
Applying this to the case at bar: (1) What was the thing or
contract In action here (2) to which the decedent was a party? Vas
It the will? "By 'thing or contract' therefore, is meant any acts.
omissions, states, events involving legal results the right of affirm-
ing or denying which, the law accords to persons." Trlckett, Law
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of Witness, 130. It could not be the will. A party to a thing or
contract in action acquires a right or incurs an obligation thereby,
enforceable by aii action. X acquires no rights nor incurred any
obligations by reason of making her will. It gave her no action
against any one, nor any one an action against her. It had no ef-
fect until her death. She could have torn it up or made a new will
without changing any of her own rights or obligations.
(3) Since there was no thing or contract in action before the
death of the decedent, "the thing or contract" cannot now be in ac.
tion.
(4) What right of the decedent has passed to Carroll? Certain
rights of the deceased may have passed by virtue of the will, but
they axe rights in tangible things such as lands and chattels which
are not things or contracts in action. "The physical chattel or
land, the right to a sum of money or a share in an enterprise, is not
the thing or contract. By the thing or contract in action Is meant
the acts of forbearances, the contract, tort, grant, concerning lands,
etc., which is the subject of controversy." Trickett, Law of Wit-
nesses, 378. Carrqll represents no right or interest of the deceased
in any such thing or contract.
(5) Is Collins' interest adverse to said right of X, i. e., the
right In the thing or contract in action? His interest seems to be
adverse to her wishes as expressed by her will rather than to any
legal right of hers. Certainly he had no interest adverse to hers in
any thing or contract in action, nor in any of her physical chattels
or land during her lifetime, nor to her right to dispose of her sepa-
rate estate by will according to law, for such right to dispose of her
eatate was limited to that part of the estate which he did not take
under the Intestate Act. We cannot say that she could dispose of
all of her property by will because of Collins' wilful and malicious
desertion of her, since such desertion has not yet been established,
and is in fact the very matter in dispute.
Hence, construing the statute literally, we find Collins a compe-
tent witness. The question however, is not thus disposed of. The
act is said to be merely declaratory of the law as it existed since
the acts of April 15, 1869, P. L. 30, and April 9, 1870, P. . 44. Pen-
nell v. Phillips, 20 Dist. 843. It is in fact drawn In almost the ex-
act words used by Justice Agnew in Karns v. Tanner, 66 'Pa. 297,
in stating the law as it existed in 1870.
Prior to 1869 any one, a party to the record or whose rights
would be affected by the outcome of the suit, was incompetent. 10
Pa. 45. Section 1, of the Act of 1869 made all persons competent
witnesses with certain exceptions, one of them being, "this act
shall not apply to actions .......... where the assignor of the thing
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or contract In action may be dead." In Karns v. Tanner, supra,
Justice Agnew said that "assignor" was not to be used in its nar-
row sense, and held the act to mean a "party" to a thing or con-
trat In action. Under this act, then, the dead person must have
been a party to a thing or contract In action. If the words of the
statute are to have any meaning. Adverse interest was not suffi-
cient to render a witness incompetent. All the cases during the
period from 1869 to 1887 holding persons incompetent under Se'ction
1 of the Act of 1869 were cases In which there was some thing or
contract in action, such as a grant, contract, tort action or claim
1arsing before the death of the decedent, to which he was a party.
We therefore believe that under the law as it was construed during
that period Collins would have been competent, and if the Act of
1887 merely declared the then existing law, he should be competent
now.
But since this act has been passed there seems to be conflict in
the decisions. In Burkett's Estate, 5 Pa. C. C. 501, decided in
1888, a widow, claiming against her husband's will the $300 worth
of exempted property was allowed to testify to facts occurring be-
fore the death of her husband; there Is no reason why, under the
same circumstances, a husband may not testify to facts occurring
before the death of hs wife. And In Hayes' Estate, 23 Pa. Super.
570, a husband claiming against the will of his wife was held coin-
petent to testify in order to explain his separation from his wife.
But in Munson v. Crookston, 219 Pa. 421, a similar case, the court
said, "But the admission of the husband as a witness, though an
error, did the appellant no injury," because a prima facie wilful
and malicious desertion had not been established. And In Schreck-
engost's Estate, 77 P.q.. Super. 235, It was said not to be error to ex-
clude the wife. However she was allowed to take against the will
on other grounds. The decislon of the question of competency was
unnecessary to the decision of these last two cases, and therefore
the statements of the courts were simply dicta. The most recent
case, Phillip's Estate, 271 Pa. 129, exactly like the case at bar, held
the husband incompetent to testify and reversed the lower court for
admitting his testimony. There was no discussion of the relevant
section of the act further than to say that his interest was adverse,
and therefore he was incompetent. In these three cases holding
the surviving spouse incompetent, more attention was paid to the
question of whether the parties were claiming by devolution than
to their competency regardless of whether they both claimed by de-
volution or not.
We do not believe that the case of Phillip's Estate has defin-
itely settled the law on this question, and we cannot agree with the
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decision in that case. Adverse interest was the sole reason ad-
vanced by the court for the exclusion of the witness. We believe
that there must be other facts present, (mentioned In the analysis
of the act, supra.) else the first part of the section is meaningless
or mere surplusage. If the Legislature had meant adverse interest
to be sufficient to exclude a witness, it could have said so much
more plainly and simply.
The justification of the rule of exclusion, expressed in the met-
aphor, "If death has closed the lips of the one party, the policy of
the law is to close the lips of the other," is based on the presump-
tion that the majority of the people are liars. The exception to the
general rule of competency is wholly the creation of statute; for as
all interested persons were excluded at common law, and then all
made competent by statute, with certain exceptions, these exceptions
can be defined only by the-statutes creating them. We can see no
reason for extending the scope of the statutory exception based on
such a presumption as the above, and must be governed by the ex-
press words of the act, which, as we have shown, render Collins a
competent witness.
It was error for the court below to exclude his testimony. The
decision is reversed and a new trial granted.
COMMONWEALTH v. RICHARDS
Criminal Law-Murder--Confession-E-Idence-Robbery
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Richards and Jackson went together to X's store for the pur-
pose of robbing. They made no agreement to shoot anyone, or for
the use of violence to the person of any one. On arriving at the
store Jackson agreed to enter while Richards remained outside, to
give the alarm, should any one intervene. Jackson entered, and un-
expectedly found X, shot and killed him. This is a prosecution for
murder. A written confession of Richard's recited various events
of his life envolving crime, was offered by the prosecution. He ol-
jected to the parts not pertaining to the particular crime under In-
vestigation, and the court excluded those parts. He then objected
to the reading of the relative parts, but the court admitted it. He
objected to the use of the killing to implicate him in murder, be-
cause there was no evidence that said killing was thought of by
him, that his purpose was simply robbery, that the shooting by his
confederate was not thought of as a possible occurrence. Verdict
of murder in the first degree.
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OPINION OF THE COURT
Pipa, J. Two questions present themselves for our determina-
tion. First, whether the trial court should have excluded the
whole confession or whether the trial court acted properly Jn ex-
cluding part of the confession by request of the defendant and ad-
mitting that part which pertained to the particular crime. Sec-
ondly, did the trial court properly allow the evidence of the killing
to be used to implicate Richards In murder, although no proof was
offered that the killing of a person was in any way thought of by
him?
As to the first question, where a confession is offered In evi-
and the court strikes out, at the request of the defendant, a portion
of it which relates to the defendant's criminal record, the latter can
not then demand that the whole of the confession be strilcken out
on the ground that when a confession is offered it must go In as a
whole. In such a case the defendant can not complain on appeal
of the action of the court In excluding, at his own instance, a por-
tion of the confession. The portion of the confession which was ex-
cluded was in regard to the defendant's conviction of crime on pre-
vious occasions. If this were admitted it certainly would have
tended to prejudice the jury against him, and its exclusion was of
course to his advantage. It would be mere trifling to permit him to
exclude a portion of it and then permit him to use the favor grant-
ed as a ground of objection against the admission of the remainder
of the confession, because it no longer contained the whole of It.
When he was permitted to object successfully to a portion of It, he
must be regarded as having waived his right to the application of
the general rule which requires the whole of the confession to go
in. Comm. v. Comporto, 233 Pa. 10.
As to the second point, proof of a plan to kill or even of an ex-
pectation that killing may result, Is not necessary to this conviction,
for the rule of criminal responsibility In case of conspiracy or com-
bination seems to be that each is responsible for every thing done
by his confederates which follows incidentally in the execution of
the common design, as one of the probable and natural consequen-
ces, even though it was not intended as a part of the original de-
sign or common plan. It has been held In this state that, when
several are engaged in a robbery and one shoots and kills the vic-
tim, all are equally guilty. It is not material which of the two
fired the fatal shot, both participated In the common purpose and
from the fact that one of them was armed with a deadly weapon, a
part of that purpose undoubtedly was to commit murder if neces-
sary to carry out the purpose even though there was not any
agreement to commit murder.
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By the 44th section of our statute of 1860 each one Is triable
and punishable as if he had fired the pistol.
Leaving out of view the purely technical objections of the de-
fendant's counsel to some of the courts rulings on evidence, inde-
pendently of these, the facts as stated and the law as announced,
establish beyond controversy the guilt of the defendant. Comm. v.
Biddle, 200 Pa. 640.
It is ordered that the judgment be affirmed and that the record
be remitted to the court below, that the sentence be executed.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
Prolonged discussion of the question here presented is unneces-
sary.
The rule Is that the whole of a confession, if any part must be
put in evidence, a rule made for the benefit of the confessant.
But, the accused preferred that a part of his confession should not
be read to the jury, and obtained from the court, an order excluding
that part. Thus succeeding, he makes the court's action a ground
for compelling it to withdraw the rest of the confession. The court
has properly refused as the judgment of the court below maintains.
Its decision must therefore be Affirmed.
PAGE v. MORTON
Mortgage-Bond and Warrant-Judgment Affidavit of Ownership-
Act of April 23, 1903, P. L. 261
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an action of ejectment by the purchaser of land on an ex-
ecution of a judgment on a warrant of attorney. X gave Y a mort-
gage on a lbt for $1000 and a bond with warrant of attorney to con-
fess judgment. The mortgage was at once recorded. X sold the
land subject to the mortgage to Morton. Y assigned the bond and
mortgage to Page, the plaintiff. Page entered judgment on the
u-arrant, giving no notice to Morton. On an execution on this judg-
merit the land was sold toPage, who in this action seeks to obtain
possession.
Miss Everhard, for the plaintiff.
Miss Burr, for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Glazer, J. There are several points raised in this case, each of
which bears on the final determination of the issue, whether the
plaintiff is entitled to possession.
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW 167
The first question is that of the relationship of the defendant
Morton to the transaction. It appears that he is a terre-tenant, de-
fined as "one who purchases or becomes the owner of land which is
encumbered," or as "one not the mortgagor who becomes seized or
possessed of land subject to the making of the mortgage and sub-
ject to its lien." Bouvier's Law Dictionary; Trickett on Liens,
Vol. III., P. 109.
The next point for consideration is the right of the plntiff, the
assignee of the mortgagee, to confess judgment on the bond and
warrant of attorney, and to levy execution on same, without having
iecourse to satisfaction of the mortgage itself. In O'Mally v. Pug-
liese., 272 Pa. 357, the Supreme Court held that a mortgagee or his
assignee mav enter Judgment on a warrant of attorney, accompany-
ing a bond, though the obligation itself has not maturea but points
out that the judgment and execution thereon remains within the
control of the court. The decision makes unnecessary any discus-
sion as to the necessity of foreclosing the mortgage before entering
judgment on the warrant of attorney.
But all this must be waived aside in the determination of the
question of necessity of notice to a terre-tenant when execution is
barred on a Judgment on a warrant of attorney. Before the Act of
April 23, 1903, P. L. 261, which amended the Act of July 9, 1901, P.
L. 617, the courts held that notice to a terre-tenant was unneces.
sary; that the land could be sold and possession taken without the
terre-tenant becoming aware of any contemplated action on the part
of the mortgagee.
This obvious hardship worked by this unequitable principle led
to the adoption of the Act of 1903 (supra) which provides that "the
plaintiff in any writ of eJectment or any writ of summons to re-
covercover .......... In any writ to charge particular land with the
payment of a particular debit running with the land, shall file with
his praecipe an affidavit, setting forth to the best of his knowledge
information and belief who are the owners of the land charged, or in
the action of ejectment are claimants thereof as the case may be,
and all persons shall be made parties to the writ which shall be
served by the sheriff .......... This act gives the terre-tenant an
opportunity to satisfy the obligation and prevents any chance of
perpetration of fraud on the terre-tenant.
In Kern v. Mayhue, 26 C. C. 390, on a question similar to the
one before us, the court held that notice to a terre-tenant was nec-
essary where the land is sold on a lien, whether the proceedings be
by scire facies on the mortgage or fiere facias on the judgment en-
tered upon the bond, since, on the latter case the lien runs with the
land.
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In the case at bar, it is admitted that plaintiff failed to give no-
tice to defendant and that latter had no opportunity to defend the
action. In Trlckett on Liens, Vol. III., P. 391, it is said "that a
terre-tenant who is not made a part to the scire facias and who does
not intervene to defend it, is not concluded by the judgment which
may be recovered by the mortgagee, but in a subsequent ejectment
between him and the purchaser at the sheriff's sale sur mortgage,
may make all the defences which he might have made to the scire
facias ............. (In support of this the following cases are
cited: Spencer v. Jennings, 114 Pa. 618; Barbour v. Werhle, 1i6
Pa. 308.
This, together with the act quoted, seems to clearly indicate
that the plaintiff's failure to give notice is a fatal weakness on his
claim to title. This failure on plaintiff's part, might give rise to
the suspicion of an intent to defraud the defendant, but since no
fraud has been alleged, that question needs no determination.
In view of the act and the authorities cited thereunder we feel
constrained to deny the plaintiff's right to possession and to declare
the law of execution or the judgment invalid. We therefore enter
judgment for the defendant.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The learned court below has given reasons for holding that the
sale on the judgment entered on a warrant of attorney given by the
mortgagees, is not valid, as against the present owner of the prem-
ises, although he acquired the land subject to the mortgage. Keene
v. Startzell, 135 Pa. 110, takes a different view. The judgment was
simply a means of foreclosing the mortgage. Its lien "relates back
to the day the mortgage was recorded, and a sale upon it discharges
the lien of the mortgage." The case is not within the intention of
the act of April 23, 1903, P. L. 261.
Despite the care shown in the opinion of the learned court be-
low, it is necessary that its judgment be Reversed.
NICHOLS v. EMERSON
Lateral Support-Removal of-Measure of Damages
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Nichols owned a tract 100 feet wide, facing on X street. On
the western side of this lot he built a house, where eastern wall co-
incided with a line running from front to rear. He sold the 50 feet
to the east of this line to Emerson, who builds a house on it, and in
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doing so excavates the soil to the depth of 10 feet. The result Is
that the eastern wall of Nichols' home falls in, and drags with it
the entire house. In this action of trespass, Nichols claims the
exit of the re-erecting of the house or the difference of the value of
the lot with the house from that of the lot without the house. The
verdict has ascertained their difference to be $9,000.
Rubinstein, for the plaintiff.
Orlando, for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Taste, J. Two questions for consideration present themselves
to this court:
1. Whether the defendant in building his house and excavat-
ing the soil to the depth of ten feet is liable to the adjoining owner
for injuries resulting from his excavations.
2. Whether the defendant under the circumstances is liable to
the adjoining owner for injury to the plaintiff's house, located on
the land which has subsided without proof of any negligence on
part of the person making excavations.
Taking up the first question. Under the common law rule the
owner of land is bound to so conduct his operations in the excava-
tion or removal of minerals from the land as not to disturb the ad-
jacent land and do injury to the owner thereof. This is a settled
law in England, followed In this country, and well settled in Penn-
sylvania. In McGettigan v. Potts, 149 Pa. 155 and Matulop v.
Coal & Iron Co., 201 Pa. 70, it was held that the plaintiff was en-
titled to the natural lateral support of her land on grounds, and if
the same were withdrawn by her neighbor in mining operations on
the same land, for an injury to her lots resulting from withdrawal
of such support or from excavations, compensations must be made.
,The right to such lateral support is an absolute one and if the ad-
joining owner withdraws it or excavates, whether negligent or not,
he is liable for injuries resulting to his neighbor's land. In the
first case cited, Justice Green citing Gilmore v. Driscoll, 122 Mass.
199, and McGuire v. Grant, 1 N. J. 356, with approval says: "But
in the case of land which is fixed in its place, each owner has the
absolute right to have his land remain in its natural condition and
it is the necessary consequence from this principle that for any in-
jury to his soil resulting from removal of natural support to which
it was entitled, the owner has a legal remedy in an action at law
against the party by whom the work was done. This does not de-
pond on negligence, but upon violation of a right of property which
has been invaded. This unqualified rule is limited to injuries caus-
ed to land itself and does not afford relief for damages by the
same means to artificial structures or buildings. For an injury to
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buildings, which is unavoidable, incident to the depression, or af-
fected by any act of his nelihbor, and if the neighbor digs upon or
Improves his land so as to injure the right, an action may be main-
tained against him for damages without proof of any negligence."
There Is no doubt whatever as to the soundness of this view, furth-
er discussion of the first question Is unnecessary, and therefore
must be answered in the affirmative.
The second question can be answered by referring to the cases
cited above. It has been held that the lateral suppori of land to
which the owner thereof has an absolute right and for the depriva-
tion of which by his neighbor he can maintain an action without
proof of negligence, extends only to the land Itself in its natural con-
dition, and does not include support for protection of buildings up-
on it. This Is well settled in England and also In our country.
Since this absolute right is limited to the right itself In its natural
condition, there can be no recovery for injuries to buildings or im-
provements resulting from withdrawal of such support In the ab-
sence of proof of negligence or carelessness In excavating adjoining
land. This Is equally well settled and the rule is nowhere more dis-
finctly announced than In Doley v. Wyeth, 2 Mass. 131, where the
court after referring to absolute rights of an adjoining owner of land
to lateral support for its In Its natural condition said: "It Is a
slide of the soil, on which they stand, caused by the excavation of a
pit on adjoining land, an action can only be maintained when a
want of due care or skill or positive negligence as contributed to
produce It." In Alexander v. Colon, 72 Superior 1, the court ex-
pressly ruled upon this point as follows. Negligence or want of
due care In excavating adjoining lands for which there Is liability
for Injury to a neighbor's building means positive negligence or
manifest want of due care, In the excavating operations, so far as
they affect adjoining properties. In the absence of any evidence of
such negligence there can be no recovery. It Is well settled that
there Is no liability for injury to a house, fence, a chicken house, a
building, a wall, unless there has been negligence.
McGettigan v. Potts, 149 Pa. 155.
Matulys v. Coal & Iron Co., 201 Pa. 70.
McQuire v. Grant, 1 N. J. 356.
No evidence of the negligence of the defendant was given.
Negligence Is not presumed, It must be proved. We must assume
that whatever would have been reasonably expected of the defend.
ant, to avert a pissible Injury to the house, he did. For disturb-
ance of the plaintiff's land, as distinguished from the building, by
the defendant's excavation, the latter Is liable whether they were
made with care or not. This case recognizes the principle of Alex-
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ander v. Colon, 72 Superior 1. Hence, the second question pre-
sented must be answered in the negative.
In the lower court Nichols claims value of the erecting of the
house, and that of the lot without the house. This verdict has Its-
certained this difference to be two thousand dollars. In view of the
authorities above stated, this court can not decide with the lower
court on its verdict.
The decree of the court below is reversed.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The plaintiff is not claiming damages for the caving in of his
ground. He furnishes no evidence as to the exteilt of such dam-
ages. What he demands is the cost of the re-erection of the house,
or the difference in value of the ground without, and its value with
the house.
There is no liability for injury to a house or other building, by
excavating on the defendant's lot, unless there was negligence. The
learned court below has indicated that there is no evidence of negli-
gence. Possibly to create an execution so deep as ten feet would
be negligent, but, that it was, does not appear. Nor does it appear
that the caving in of plaintiff's ground, would have occurred, but
for the pressure of the house upon it. Defendant did not owe sup-
port sufficient to sustain the ground, despite artificial weights
placed on it. It does not appear then, that there is any liability.
But if there was liability, it was not to pay the difference be-
tween the value of the plaintiff's lot with, and its value without
the house, or the cost of re.erection of the house. McGettigan v.
Potts, 149 Pa. 155. "The amount of the injury actually done to the
plaintiff's land," naust be shown, and only for it there can be a re-
covery. That amount has not been shown.
The learned court's opinion might have been clearer, but we un-
derstand it to lay down the doctrines thus enunciated. The judg-
ment is therefore Affirmed.
HUGHES v. MARKS
Negotiable Instruments-Checks--Holder in Due Course-Burden of
Proof-Evidence-Admissibility
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Marks drew a check for $250, payable to Simpson, who, three
days afterwards indorsed it to Hughes. Hughes presented the check
to the bank for payment five days after it was drawn. The bank
told him that Marks had ordered not to pay the check. Marks, sued
172 DICKTNSON LAW REVIEW
as drawer, depends on the ground that Simpson obtained the cheoi
by fraud. Hughes testifies that he had no knowledge of the fraud
when he received the check for which, he gave a consideration.
the court not submitting this testimony to the jury, directed it.to
return a verdict for the plaintiff. Motion for a new trial.
Kahaner, for the plaintiff.
Forman, for the defendant.
OPINIONI OF THT COURT
Satterlee, J.' We are of the opinion that the lower court erred
in not admitting the testimony of the defendant and entering a ver-
dict for the plaintiff.
There seems to be no question in the minds of the court but
what the check was issued in due course. According to Section 59
of the Negotiable Instrument Act, we find the definition laid down
"that every holder is deemed prima facie to be a holder in due
course." It further says that if the title is defective, the prima
facie presumption is overcome and a contrary presumption is cre-
ated in favor of the maker, and it is for all purposes a thing of sub-
stance and value to the party defending. The failure of the lower
court to admit the defendant's testimony Is strictly a deprivation
of the defendant's rights, and as such was the case the defendant
was not accorded the privilege given him by the act to rebut the
prima facie presumption.
In deciding our opinion we are forced to base our verdict upox.
the rulings as laid down in McKinley v. Wainstein, 74 Pa. Super.
Ct. 482. With the facts similar to those at bar, the court held it
reversible error on the part of the lower court to exclude the testi-
mony of the defendant. They held that by excluding the testimony,
the defendant was deprived of his right to rebut the presumption,
and prove to the satisfaction of the court, the circumstances unier
which the check was issued.
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that the lower
court erred in granting a verdict for the plaintiff and as it has been
held to be reversible error by a recent case with similar facts, we
do not hesitate In reversing the judgment of the lower court.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
We assume that the check was payable to Simpson or his or
der, I. e., was negotiable.
It was endorsed to Hughes, who thus acquired the legal title to
it.
Marks, the drawer, has countermanded the order on the bank
contained in the check, and has thus prevented the bank's paying
It.
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Hughes has sued Marks, the maker. No defence is visible, un-
less (a) fraud was practiced on Marks by Simpson, and unless (b)
Hughes paid nothing for the check, or had knowledge of the fraud,
when he purchased the check.
Marks has shown fraud by Simpson.
But Hughes has testified that he had no knowledge of this
fraud, and that he paid a consideration for it. He was a competent
witness, and why his testimony was not submitted to the jury, with
instruction that if they believed it, he was entitled to recover, even
if the fraud of Simpson was established, we do not understand.
A fraudulently procured check can be defended against as to
one who is a gratuitous holder of it, not a purchaser in due course,
but cannot be, as respects a purchaser for value who purchased it
bona fide.
The judgment of the learned court below is Affirmed.
DAUGHERTY v. KENMERER
Contract-Sales Contract-Return of Articles by Customers
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Daugherty placed fifty copies of "Blood and Sand" in Kem-
merer's hands for sale. After selling them Kemmerer took back
twenty copies from purchasers and wants credit for them. There
had previously been ten returns out of fifteen copies sold and Kem-
merer had been allowed by Daugherty, credit for them, but when he
received the fifty copies no reference was made to the previous tran-
saction.
Plaintiff insists on recovering the price of the fifty copies.
Parsons, for the Plaintiff.
Neuman, for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Shaw, J. In the case at bar the fact that Daugherty
pLaced fifty copies of "Blood and Sand" in Kemmerer's hands for
sale created a contractual relationship between the parties. Kem-
merer was evidently to collect and account for the proceeds from the
sale of the books. The fact that Kemmerer received the fifty copies
of "Blood and Sand" without being stipulated in the agreement
his right to turn back copies that may be returned by purchasers
and receive credit for them must be governed by this intention of
the parties.
The question to be determined is whether the evidence of the
previous custom of returning copies can be admited to show the de-
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fendants right to return the copies unsold. There is evidence froia
the course of dealings between the parties that Kemmerer had pre-
viously been allowed by Daugherty credit for ten copies returned out
of fifteen copies sold.
Since the right to return has been previously recognized, the fact
that Kemmerer received the fifty copies for sale without mention of
the prior custom, estops Daugherty to deny Kemmerer's right to re-
turn the twenty copies that have been returned by purchasers even
though the right is not mentioned in the latter agreement.
In Tabard Inn Book Co. v. Snellenberger, 65 Sup. Ct. 177, the
lower court permitted the defendant to show that the course of
dealings of the parties previously had permitted defendant to send
back books that had been returned by customers and that credit had
been allowed for them, and that thus plaintiff had recognized the
defandant's right to return. There was nothing in the agreement
to cover the subject. The jury found for the defendant and was up-
held by the Superior Court which ruled that the verdict must be
based on the understanding of the parties.
In view of the recent Superior Court decision in 65 Sup. 177,
which is based on facts very similar to the case at issue, judgment
is rendered for the defendant.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The books were put into the defendant's hands for sale. Until
sale, he was not liable for their price. Some have been sold, and he
has permitted the buyers to return them, and insists that he is not
bound to account for their price. Is he?
Ordinarily, having completed a sale, he would not have the
right to rescind it, and so escape liability for the price. The right
to sell does not embrace that to cancel a completed sale. But, it
may have been the understanding of the parties that defendant
should be allowed to cancel any sales and permitted to return to the
plaintiff books whose sales had been thus rescinded, instead of their
price. May we resort to their previous dealings as evidence? Fif-
teen previous contracts of a similar sort had been made. Under ten
of them there had been an undisputed return of books, whose sales
had been cancelled. It does not appear that the right thus to re-
turn books, had been questioned in the other cases. This fact may
be considered in learning the intentions of the parties.
For reasons given by the learned court below Its judgment Is
Affirmed.
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HARLAN'S ESTATE
Decedents' Estate-Claims for Services-Physician--Gratuitous Ser-
vices
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mrs. Harlan, a very poor old lady had a sick child, to attend
whom she called in Dr. Forbes, who was accustomed to give services
in such cases without demanding satisfactory compensation. He
had no intention of claiming compensation in this case. Three
years later, Mrs. Harlan died leaving an estate of $275.00. Dr.
Forbes presented a demand for $25.00. The auditor has rejected the
claim, on the ground that when the services were rendered they
were intended to be gratuitous.
Claster, for the plaintiff.
Croop, for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Crow, J. The question arising in this case is, whether the es-
tate of the der-eased is bound to pay the claim for professional servi-
ces rendered by the plaintiff during the lifetime of the deceased.
It is our opinion that the auditor's report was correct and it
should be confirmed.
We find that the law is well settled that there can be no recov-
ery for voluntary services. In 24 C. J., Sec. 879, we find that.
"Compensation cannot be allowed for services which were performed
without any claim for payment during the decedent's lifetime, or
any expectation of being paid specifically therefor, and without any
express or implied promise of remuneration." In Pa., even though
their performances may have been prompted by the hope of obtain-
ing a gift or legacy which has not been fulfilled, they cannot recov-
er any compensation. Estate of Mahlon Miller, 136 Pa. 239. We
also find that even if the deceased directed his executors to pay foe
services rendered voluntarily to the decedent, it will not create a
claim against the estate. Fehl's Estate, 13 Superior 601. These
two cases cited present even stronger claims against the estate than
the case at bar, yet there was no recovery in them on the stronger
and clearer claims.
"Claims for services against a decedent's estate, fiot made dur-
ing the lifetime of the decedent, are looked upon by the courts with
a great deal of suspicion, and in order to establish such a claim the
evidence must be other than that of mere loose declarations, and
must be such as to clearly and distinctly establish a contract, either
express or implied, between the claimant and the decedent." Weav-
er's Estate, 182 Pa. 349. We cannot see where the evidence in the
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case at bar is such that would clearly establish a contract between
the claimant and the decedent.
In Nagy's Estate, 64 Superior 28, the facts are directly as the
facts in the case at bar. The doctor in this Case administered pro-
fessional services to the minor children of a widow and he did it
gratuitously. The doctor was paid by a coal company for services
rendered their employees, but as the widow and children were not
employees of the coal company, it can not be said that he rendered
services expecting compensation from the coal company as was con-
tended by the counsel for the plaintiff. This case holds that,
'Where a physician renders gratuitous services to the minor child-
ren of a widow, he cannot after the death of the widow change his
mind, and present a claim against the estate of the widow for pay-
ment for his services on a Quantum Meruit.
An auditor's finding of fact is like the verdict of a jury; it is
binding upon the court, unless manifest error is made apparent In
the finding or in the verdict. 64 Superior 28. We must therefor
take the question of fact as being true, and that is that the doctor's
intention was to render the services gratuitously. With this fact
settled we can see no room for an inference of an Implied contract
as is contended by the counsel for the plaintiff. The cases and au-
thorities on this point are unanimous, and the auditor's report is ac-
cordingly confirmed.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The reasons assigned by the learned court below, and the author-
ities cited by it, fully sustains its decision. The judgment is Af-
firmed.
